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Twitter, a popular social media outlet, has evolved into a vast source of linguistic data, rich
with opinion, sentiment, and discussion. Due to the increasing popularity of Twitter, its perceived
potential for exerting social influence has led to the rise of a diverse community of automatons,
commonly referred to as bots. These inorganic and semi-organic Twitter entities can range from the
benevolent (e.g., weather-update bots, help-wanted-alert bots) to the malevolent (e.g., spamming
messages, advertisements, or radical opinions). Existing detection algorithms typically leverage
metadata (time between tweets, number of followers, etc.) to identify robotic accounts. Here,
we present a powerful classification scheme that exclusively uses the natural language text from
organic users to provide a criterion for identifying accounts posting automated messages. Since the
classifier operates on text alone, it is flexible and may be applied to any textual data beyond the
Twittersphere.
PACS numbers:
I. INTRODUCTION
Twitter has become a mainstream social outlet for the
discussion of a myriad of topics through microblogging
interactions. Members chiefly communicate via short
text-based public messages restricted to 140 characters,
called tweets. As Twitter has evolved from a simple
microblogging social media interface into a mainstream
source of communication for the discussion of current
events, politics, consumer goods/services, it has become
increasingly enticing for parties to gameify the system by
creating automated software to send messages to organic
(human) accounts as a means for personal gain and for
influence manipulation [1, 2]. The results of sentiment
and topical analyses can be skewed by robotic accounts
that dilute legitimate public opinion by algorithmically
generating vast amounts of inorganic content. Neverthe-
less, data from Twitter is becoming a source of interest
in public health and economic research in monitoring the
spread of disease [3, 4] and gaining insight into public
health trends [5].
In related work [6–9], researchers have built classifi-
cation algorithms using metadata idiosyncratic to Twit-
ter, including the number of followers, posting frequency,
account age, number of user mentions/replies, username
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length, and number of retweets. However, relying on
metadata can be problematic: sophisticated spam algo-
rithms now emulate the daily cycle of human activity and
author borrowed content to appear human [6]. Anoth-
er problematic spam tactic is the renting of accounts of
legitimate users (called sponsored accounts), to introduce
short bursts of spam and hide under the user’s organic
metadata to mask the attack [10].
A content based classifier proposed by [18] measures
the entropy between Twitter time intervals along with
user meta data to classify Twitter accounts, and requires
a comparable number of tweets (≥ 60) for adequate
classification accuracy as our proposed method. Senti-
Bot, another content based classifier [19], utilizes latent
Dirichlet allocation (LDA) for topical categorization
combined with sentiment analysis techniques to classi-
fy individuals as either bots or humans. We note that as
these automated entities evolve their strategies, combi-
nations of our proposed methods and studies previously
mentioned may be required to achieve reasonable stan-
dards for classification accuracy. Our method classifies
accounts solely based upon their linguistic attributes and
hence can easily be integrated into these other proposed
strategies.
We introduce a classification algorithm that operates
using three linguistic attributes of a user’s text. The
algorithm analyzes:
1. the average URL count per tweet
2. the average pairwise lexical dissimilarity between a
Typeset by REVTEX
ar
X
iv
:1
50
5.
04
34
2v
6 
 [c
s.C
L]
  1
4 J
un
 20
16
2user’s tweets, and
3. the word introduction rate decay parameter of the
user for various proportions of time-ordered tweets
We provide detailed descriptions of each attribute in
the next section. We then test and validate our algorithm
on 1 000 accounts which were hand coded as automated
or human.
We find that for organic users, these three attributes
are densely clustered, but can vary greatly for automa-
tons. We compute the average and standard deviation of
each of these dimensions for various numbers of tweets
from the human coded organic users in the dataset. We
classify accounts by their distance from the averages from
each of these attributes. The accuracy of the classifier
increases with the number of tweets collected per user.
Since this algorithm operates independently from user
metadata, robotic accounts do not have the ability to
adaptively conceal their identities by manipulating their
user attributes algorithmically. Also, since the classifi-
er is built from time ordered tweets, it can determine
if a once legitimate user begins demonstrating dubious
behavior and spam tactics. This allows for social media
data-miners to dampen a noisy dataset by weeding out
suspicious accounts and focus on purely organic tweets.
II. DATA HANDLING
A. Data-Collection
We filtered a 1% sample of Twitter’s streaming API
(the spritzer feed) for tweets containing geo-spatial meta-
data spanning the months of April through July in 2014.
Since roughly 1% of tweets provided GPS located spa-
tial coordinates, our sample represents nearly all of the
tweets from users who enable geotagging. This allows
for much more complete coverage of each user’s account.
From this sample, we collected all of the geo-tweets from
the most active 1 000 users for classification as human or
robot and call this the Geo-Tweet dataset.
B. Social HoneyPots
To place our classifier in the context of recent work,
we applied our algorithm to another set of accounts col-
lected from the Social HoneyPot Experiment [11]. This
work exacted a more elaborate approach to find auto-
mated accounts on Twitter by creating a network of
fake accounts (called Devils [12]) that would tweet about
trending topics amongst themselves in order to tempt
robotic interactions. The experiment was analyzed and
compiled into a dataset containing the tweets of “legit-
imate users” and those classified as “content polluters”.
We note that the users in this dataset were not hand cod-
ed. Accounts that followed the Devil honeypot accounts
were deemed robots. Their organic users were compiled
FIG. 1: The feature distribution of the 1000 hand coded
users are summarized with histograms and violin plots. These
show the wide variation in automated features versus Organ-
ics. Violin plots show the kernel density estimation of each
distribution. Using the Organic features, automated entities
are identified by exclusion.
from a random sample of Twitter, and were only deemed
organic because these accounts were not suspended by
Twitter at the time. Hence the full HoneyPot dataset
can only serve as an estimate of the capability of this
classification scheme.
C. Human Classification of Geo-Tweets
Each of the 1 000 users were hand classified separately
by two evaluators. All collected tweets from each user
were reviewed until the evaluator noticed the presence
of automation. If no subsample of tweets appeared to
be algorithmically generated, the user was classified as
human. The results were merged, and conflicting entries
were resolved to produce a final list of user ids and cod-
ings. See Figure 1 for histograms and violin plots sum-
marizing the distributions of each user class. We note
that any form of perceived automation was sufficient to
deem the account as automated. See SI for samples of
each of these types of tweets from each user class and a
more thorough description of the annotation process.
D. Types of Users
We consider organic content, i.e. from human
accounts, as those that have not tweeted in an algo-
rithmic fashion. We focused on three distinct classes of
automated tweeting:
Robots: Tweets from these accounts draw on a
strictly limited vocabulary. The messages follow a very
structured pattern, many of which are in the form
3of automated updates. Examples include Weather
Condition Update Accounts, Police Scanner Update
Accounts, Help Wanted Update Accounts, etc.
Cyborgs: The most covert of the three, these
automatons exhibit human-like behavior and messages
through loosely structured, generic, automated messages
and from borrowed content copied from other sources.
Since many malicious cyborgs on Twitter try to market
an idea or product, a high proportion of their tweets
contain URLs, analogous to spam campaigns studied
on Facebook [13]. Messages range from the backdoor
advertising of goods and services [14] to those trying
to influence social opinion or even censor political
conversations [15]. These accounts act like puppets from
a central algorithmic puppeteer to push their product
on organic users while trying to appear like an organic
user [16]. Since these accounts tend to borrow content,
they have a much larger vocabulary in comparison to
ordinary robots. Due to Twitter’s 140 character-per-
tweet restriction, some of the borrowed content being
posted must be truncated. A notable attribute of many
cyborgs is the presence of incomplete messages followed
by an ellipsis and a URL. Included in this category are
‘malicious promoter’ accounts [11] that are radically
promoting a business or an idea systematically.
Human Spammers: These are legitimate accounts
that abuse an algorithm to post a burst of almost indis-
tinguishable tweets that may differ by a character in
order to fool Twitter’s spam detection protocols. These
messages are directed at a particular user, commonly for
a follow request to attempt to increase their social reach
and influence.
Although we restrict our focus to the aforementioned
classes, we did notice the presence of other subclass-
es, which we have named “listers”, and “quoters”, that
have both organic and automaton features. Listers are
accounts that send their messages to large groups of indi-
viduals at once. Quoters are dedicated accounts that are
referencing distant passages from literature or song lyrics.
Most of the tweets from these accounts are all encased in
quotations. These accounts also separately tweet organic
content. We classified these accounts as human because
there was not sufficient evidence suggesting these behav-
iors were indeed automated.
III. METHODS
A. Classification Algorithm
The classifier, C, takes ordinal samples of tweets from
each user, µ, of varying number, s, to determine if the
user is a human posting strictly organic content or is
algorithmically automating tweets:
C : µs → {0, 1} = {Organic, Automaton}.
Although we have classified each automaton into three
distinct classes, the classifier is built more simply to
detect and separate organic content from automated. To
classify the tweets from a user, we measure three distinct
linguistic attributes:
1. Average Pairwise Tweet Dissimilarity,
2. Word Introduction Rate Decay Parameter,
3. Average number of URLs (hyperlinks) per tweet.
B. Average Pairwise Tweet
Dissimilarity
Many algorithmically generated tweets contain similar
structures with minor character replacements and long
chains of common substrings. Purely organic accounts
have tweets that are very dissimilar on average. The
length of a tweet, t, is defined as the number of char-
acters in the tweet and is denoted |t|. Each tweet is
cleaned by truncating multiple whitespace characters and
the metric is performed case insensitively. A sample of
s tweets from a particular user is denoted T sµ. Given a
pair of tweets from a particular user, ti, tj ∈ T sµ, the pair-
wise tweet dissimilarity, D(ti, tj), is given by subtracting
the length of the longest common subsequence of both
tweets, |LCS(ti, tj)| and then weighting by the sum of
the lengths of both tweets:
D(ti, tj) =
|ti|+ |tj | − 2 · |LCS(ti, tj)|
|ti|+ |tj | .
The average tweet dissimilarity of user µ for sample size
of s tweets is calculated as:
µslcs =
1(
s
2
) · ∑
ti,tj∈T sµ
D(ti, tj).
For example, given the two tweets:
(t1, t2) = (I love Twitter, I love to spam). Then |t1| =
|t2| = 14, LCS(t1, t2) = |I love t| = 8 (including whites-
paces) and we calculate the pairwise tweet dissimilarity
as:
D(t1, t2) =
14 + 14− 2 · 8
14 + 14
=
12
28
=
3
7
.
C. Word Introduction Decay Rate
Since social robots automate messages, they have
a limited and crystalline vocabulary in comparison to
organic accounts. Even cyborgs that mask their automa-
tions with borrowed content cannot fully mimic the rate
at which organic users introduce unique words into their
text over time. The word introduction rate is a mea-
sure of the number of unique word types introduced
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FIG. 2: The rank-unique word gap distribution is plotted on
a logscale for each user class.
over time from a given sample of text [17]. The rate at
which unique words are introduced naturally decays over
time, and is observably different between automated and
organic text. By testing many random word shufflings
of a text, we define mn as the average number of words
between the nth and n + 1st initial unique word type
appearances. From [17], the word introduction decay
rate, α(n), is given as
α(n) = 1/mn ∝ n−γ for γ > 0.
For each user, the scaling exponent of the word intro-
duction decay rate, α, is approximated by performing
standard linear regression on the last third of the log-
transformed tail of the average gap size distribution as a
function of word introduction number, n [17]. In figure 2
below, the log transformed rank-unique word gap distri-
bution is given for each individual in the data set. Here
the human population (green) is distinctly distributed in
comparison to the automatons.
D. Average URLs per Tweet
Hyperlinks (URLs) help automatons spread spam and
malware [10, 20, 21] . A high fraction of tweets from
spammers tend to contain some type of URL in com-
parison to organic individuals, making the average URLs
per tweet a valuable attribute for bot classification algo-
rithms [8, 22, 23]. For each user, the average URL rate is
measured by the total number of occurrences of the sub-
string ‘http:’ within tweets, and then divided by the total
number of tweets authored by the user in the sample of
size s:
µsurl =
#Occurrences of ‘http:’
#Sampled Tweets
.
E. Cross Validation Experiment
We perform a standard 10-fold Cross Validation pro-
cedure on the 2014 Geo-Tweet data set to measure the
accuracy of using each linguistic feature for classifying
Organic accounts. We divided individuals into 10 equal-
ly sized groups. Then 10 trials are performed where 9 of
the 10 groups are used to train the algorithm to classify
the final group.
During the Calibration phase, we measure each of
the three features for every human coded account in
the training set. We sequentially collect tweets from
each user from a random starting position in time. We
record the arithmetic mean and standard deviation of the
Organic attributes to classify the remaining group. The
classifier distinguishes Human from Automaton by using
a varying threshold, n, from the average attribute value
computed from the training set. For each attribute, we
classify each user as an automaton if their feature falls
further than n standard deviations away from the organic
mean, for varying n.
For each trial, the False Positives and True Positives
for a varying window size, n, are recorded. To compare
to other bot-detection strategies, we rate True Positives
as the success at which the classifier identifies automa-
tons by exclusion, and False Positives as humans that
are incorrectly classified as automatons. The results
of the trials for varying tweet sizes are averaged and
visualized with a Receiver Operator Characteristic curve
(ROC) (see Figure 3). The accuracy of each experiment
is measured as the area under the ROC, or AUC. To
benchmark the classifier, a 10-fold cross validation was
also performed on the HoneyPot tweet-set which we
describe in the following section.
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
A. Geo-Tweet Classification Validation
The ROC curves for the Geo-Tweet 10 fold Cross Val-
idation Experiment for varying tweet bins in Figure 3
show that the accuracy increases as a function of num-
ber of tweets.
Although the accuracy of the classifier increases with
the number of collected tweets, we see in Figure 4 that
within 50 tweets the accuracy of the average of 10 ran-
dom trials is only slightly higher than a 500 tweet user
sample. While this is very beneficial to our task (isolating
humans), we note that larger samples see greater returns
when one instead wants to isolate spammers, that tweet
random bursts of automation.
5FIG. 3: The receiver operator characteristic curve from the
10-fold Cross Validation Experiment performed on the Geo
Tweets collected from April through July 2014. The True
Positive (TP), False Positive (FP), and thresholds, N , are
averaged across the 10 trials. The accuracies are approximat-
ed by the AUCs, which we compute using the trapezoid rule.
The points depict the best experimental model thresholding
window (N).
B. HoneyPot External Validation
The classifier was tested on the Social Honeypot
Twitter-bot dataset provided by [11]. Results are visu-
alized with a ROC curve in Figure 5. The averaged
optimal threshold for the full English user dataset (blue
curve) had a high true positive rate (correctly classified
automatons: 86%), but also had a large false positive
rate (misclassified humans: 22%).
The Honeypot Dataset relied on Twitter’s spam detec-
tion protocols to label their randomly collected “legiti-
mate users”. Some forms of automation (weather-bots,
help-wanted bots) are permitted by Twitter. Other
cyborgs that are posting borrowed organic content can
fool Twitter’s automation criterion. This ill formation of
the training set greatly reduces the ability of the classifier
to distinguish humans from automatons, since the clas-
sifier gets the wrong information about what constitutes
a human. To see this, a random sample of 1 000 English
Honeypot users was hand-coded to mirror the previous
experiment. On this smaller sample (black curve in Fig-
ure 4), the averaged optimal threshold accuracy increased
to 96%.
C. Calibrated Classifier Performance
We created the thresholding window of final calibrat-
ed classifier using the results from the calibration exper-
iment. We average the optimal parameters from the 10
fold cross validation on the Geo-Tweet dataset from each
FIG. 4: Accuracy, computed as the AUC is plotted as a func-
tion of number of tweets, ranging from 25 to 500. The average
True Positive and False Positive Rates over 10 trials is given
on twin axes with error bars drawn using the standard error.
FIG. 5: Honey Pot Data Set, 10 fold Cross Validation Perfor-
mance for users with 200 tweets. The black curve represents
the 1 000 hand coded HoneyPot users, while the blue curve is
the entire English Honeypot dataset. The accuracy increases
from 84% to 96%.
of the 10 calibration trials for tweet bins ranging from 25
to 500 in increments of 25 tweets. We also average and
record the optimal parameter windows, nopt and their
standard deviations, σopt. The standard deviations serve
as a tuning parameter to increase the sensitivity of the
classifier, by increasing the feature cutoff window (n).
The results from applying the calibrated classifier to the
6FIG. 6: Calibrated Classifier Performance on 1 000 User Geo-
Tweet Dataset. Correctly classified humans (True Negative),
are coded in Green, while correctly identified automatons
(True Positives) are coded in red. The 400 tweet average opti-
mal thresholds from the cross validation experiment designate
the thresholding for each feature. The black lines demon-
strates each feature cutoff.
full set of 1 000 users, using 400 tweet bags is given in Fig-
ure 6. The feature cutoff window (black lines) estimates
if the user’s content is organic or automated. Human fea-
ture sets (True Negatives: 716) are densely distributed
with a 4.79% False Positive Rate (i.e., humans classified
as robots). The classifier accurately classified 90.32%
of the automated accounts and 95.21% of the Organic
accounts. See Figure S1 for a cross sectional comparison
of each feature set. We note that future work may apply
different methods in statistical classification to optimize
these feature sets, and that using these simple cutoffs
already leads to a high level of accuracy.
V. CONCLUSION
Using a flexible and transparent classification scheme,
we have demonstrated the potential of using linguistic
features as a means of classifying automated activity on
Twitter. Since these features do not use the metada-
ta provided by Twitter, our classification scheme may
be applicable outside of the Twittersphere. Future work
can extend this analysis multilingually and incorporate
additional feature sets with an analogous classification
scheme. URL content can also be more deeply analyzed
to identify organic versus SPAM related hyperlinks.
We note the potential for future research to investigate
and to distinguish between each sub-class of automa-
ton. We formed our taxonomy according to the differ-
ent modes of text production. Our efforts were primar-
ily focused in separating any form of automation from
organic,human content. In doing so we recognized three
distinct classes of these types of automated accounts.
However, boundary cases (e.g. cyborg-spammers, robot-
spammers, robotic-cyborgs, etc.) along with other poten-
tial aforementioned subclasses (e.g. listers, quoters, etc.)
can limit the prowess of our current classification scheme
tailored towards these subclasses. We have shown that
human content is distinctly different from these forms of
automation, and that for a binary classification of auto-
mated or human, these features have a very reasonable
performance with our proposed algorithm.
Our study distinguishes itself by focusing on auto-
mated behavior that is tolerated by Twitter, since
both types of inorganic content can skew the results of
sociolinguistic analyses. This is particularly important,
since Twitter has become a possible outlet for health
economics [4] research including monitoring patient
satisfaction and modeling disease spread [3, 24]. Mon-
itoring excessive social media marketing of electronic
nicotine delivery systems (also known as e-cigarettes),
discussed in [25, 26], makes classifying organic and
automated activity relevant for research that can benefit
policy-makers regarding public health agendas. Isolating
organic content on Twitter can help dampen noisy
data-sets and is pertinent for research involving social
media data and other linguistic data sources where a
mixture of humans and automatons exist.
In health care, a cardinal problem with the use of elec-
tronic medical records is their lack of interoperability.
This is compounded by a lack of standardization and
use of data dictionaries which results in a lack of preci-
sion concerning our ability to collate signs, symptoms,
and diagnoses. The use of millions or billions of tweets
concerning a given symptom or diagnosis might help to
improve that precision. But it would be a major set-
back if the insertion of data tweeted from automatons
would obscure useful interpretation of such data. We
hope that the approaches we have outlined in the present
manuscript will help alleviate such problems.
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S1: Cross Sectional Classifier Performance
FIG. S1 Calibrated Classifier Performance on 1 000 User Geo Tweet Dataset. Correctly classified humans (True
Negatives), are coded in Green, while correctly identified automatons (True Positives) are coded in red. The 400
tweet average optimal thresholds from the cross validation experiment designate the thresholding for each feature.
The black lines demonstrate each feature cutoff.
9S2: Model Comparisons
Receiver Operator Characteristic (ROC) Curves of the performance of each individual feature are given in FIG.
S2 below. We see each feature set performs comparably with accuracies (measured as AUC) ranging from 80% to
91% depending on the number of tweets compiled in the analysis. Combinations of each metric greatly increases the
classification accuracy, the apparent most accurate model uses all three features. However, it is notable that combi-
nations of two of these features perform strongly in comparison. It is also notable that the word introduction decay
parameter coupled with the average URL rate performs as well as the Dissimilarity-URL model. The Dissimilarity
metric requires determining the Longest Common Substring between many sets of tweets which is computationally
expensive compared to analytically calculating the Word Introduction Decay Parameter.
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S3: Word Introduction Decay Parameter
Here, we expand upon our description of the Word Introduction Decay Parameter. This parameter is based upon
random word shufflings of a text, but is computed via the analytic formula given in Eq 8. of [16]. To determine
the decay rate parameter, we: (1) compute the word introduction rate as a function of word number, n, and (2)
regress in log-log space for a power law decay rate parameter measuring in the final third for the tail, where the decay
rate assumes the form of a power law. While this heuristic is crude and could certainly be refined to more precisely
measure the power law region, which can vary with corpus size, the tightness of organic-user clustering afforded by
this parameter, coupled with its computationally cheap cost when compared to the pairwise tweet dissimilarity metric
affords us great power for bot discrimination.
In Figure S3 below the unique word introduction gaps are plotted in log-space as a function of unique word
introduction number (rank) for each individual in our data set for various numbers of tweets. We see the distribution
growing with the number of tweets. However, at each resolution, the human class is very distinctly distributed in
comparison to each form of automation. Even within 25 tweets, the human clustering is visually apparent versus their
automated counterparts.
In Figure S4 below, we visualize the stability of this parameter between an individual’s set of tweets. The tweets
from each account in our data set were resampled 100 times to recompute the word introduction decay parameter for
25 tweets (top) and 400 tweets (bottom). The standard deviation between each account’s 100 decay parameters is
given in the histogram. The average standard deviation across all individuals of each set, µ, is given in the title of
each histogram. Notably, the humans have very little deviation (i.e. within the ’window of forgiveness’) for both sets
of tweets. Automated classes, in particular spammers, can vary quite wildly depending on the sample of tweets that
are analyzed. In particular, spammers look similar to (and usually are) humans and if the spamming event is not
captured in the sampled data they will be misclassified. This decay parameter for human text is robust for varying
sets of tweets and is quite distinguishable from automated accounts.
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S4: Human Annotation of Twitter Accounts
In this section we describe the annotation process for
classifying user accounts. Each of the one-thousand
accounts were separately classified by two evaluators. All
of the collected tweets from each account were assessed
until the presence of automation was uncovered. An
account was coded as ‘human’ if no automated posting
presence was detected (i.e. an algorithm posting on the
individual’s behalf). The inter-rater reliability is sum-
marized in the table below by listing the classification
discrepancies between account classes. For each class,
the counts of the type of rating are displayed. For exam-
ple, the Human class had a total of 6 account discrep-
ancies which is composed of 12 different scores (6 from
each rater) - 5 human codings, 3 robot, 0 cyborg, and 4
spammers.
The reliability between raters was favorable (91.49%)
for the entire dataset. The largest source of discrep-
ancies were from the ‘Robot’ and ‘Spammer’ classes.
The ’Spammer’ class was most confused with ’Humans’-
which is intuitive because many of these individuals were
humans that utilized a algorithm to SPAM a particu-
lar message. ‘Robots’ were commonly confused with
’cyborgs’. This is most likely due to boundary cases
regarding both classes. The boundaries between these
classes can at time be ambiguous. We classified cyborgs
as automatons that were posting ‘borrowed content‘ from
another source or an account that used human assist-
ed automation, i.e. a human that could be overseeing
an automated account. Robots were defined as strictly
posting structured automated messages in the forms of
updates. Perhaps future work can work to sub classify
different types of robots and cyborgs to investigate the
ecology of these automatons.
TABLE I: Annotation Discrepancies of Twitter Accounts
Class Discrepancies Totals
Human Robot Cyborg Spammer
Human 5 3 0 4 0.79%
Cyborg 2 9 6 1 9.89%
Robot 0 31 32 1 60.38%
Spammer 31 4 4 37 36.89%
All 6 9 32 38 8.51%
Each discrepancy was revisited by both annotators and
discussed until a class was determined. For extreme
boundary cases, the account ID was searched via the
hyperlink: https://twitter.com/intent/user?user_
id=###. This helped observe other user features (screen
name, description, etc.) to make a better decision about
the user. This was especially helpful for identifying pro-
motional accounts or news sources.
Screen shots of particular accounts are given below
to help describe the annotation process. Each anno-
tator scrolled through a terminal interface containing
each individual’s tweets. Scrolling through ’human‘
text appears un-ordered and chaotic with very little
structure. Automated accounts have very structured
messages, hence these patterns become very apparent in
comparison to human accounts.
Cyborg Account Example: A canonical cyborg’s
tweets are given below. This particular automaton is a
news promotional account that is tweeting links to arti-
cles. Notice the description tailors off when it reaches the
character limit and shows this with an ellipses (...) next
to a URL.
Robot Account Example: Robots tweet generically
structured messages, usually as a form of update. These
automatons have a very limited vocabulary and in gen-
eral only change a few characters per tweet. This robot
(below) is an example of a weather update bot that is
tweeting statistics about the weather at regular intervals.
Spammer Account Example: Tweets from a spam-
ming human account are given below. This individual
has utilized an algorithm to tweet at a musical celebri-
ty. Many of these spam algorithms try to fool Twitter’s
detector by including a different number or symbol at the
end of the tweet.
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S5: Mixed User Sample Tweets
TABLE II: Robot Sample Tweets
No. Tweet
1 #SuspiciousPerson 3955 W D JUDGE DR 32808 (7/26 22:19) #Orlando #MercyDrive
2 #AccidentWithRoadBlockage LEEVISTA BV &amp; S SEMORAN BV N/A (6/24 18:07) #Orlando #CentralBusinessDistrict
3 @USER the 1st mention of #sunnysmiles appears on your TL. Now is Trending Topic in United States! #trndnl
4 TRAFFIC STOP at SE 181ST AVE / SE PINE ST, GRESHAM, OR [Gresham Police #PG14000039852] 23:58 #pdx911
5 A 2002 Ford Ranger was just scanned near Cleveland, TN 37311 URL #myvinny #startup #buyacar
6 Visiting #SantaCruz, #California? Check out this great new app for news, weather, hotels, and food here! URL
7 Trend Alert: #heatJustinBieber. More trends at URL #trndnl URL
8 Temp: 76.5F — Humidity: 70% — Wind: — @USER 0.0 mph — Barometer: 30.01 in — Dewpoint: 66.0F
9 On Sunday 4, #WinUgly was Trending Topic in Pittsburgh for 10 hours: URL #trndnl
10 Wind 0.0 mph —. Barometer 1016.0 mb, Rising slowly. Temperature 67.6 F. Rain today 0.46 in. Humidity 96%
TABLE III: Cyborg Sample Tweets
No. Tweet
1 Indianapolis, IN suburb Family practice physi... - Soliant Health: (#Indianapolis, IN) URL #FamilyPractice #Job
2 Barnabas Health: Patient Care Associate (#LongBranch, NJ) URL #Nursing #Job #Jobs #TweetMyJobs
3 Overlake offers a low-cost way to check lungs for cancer early: Doctors at Overlake say they?re tired of waiting... URL
4 #TweetMyJobs #Nursing #Job alert: Opening — Accountable Healthcare Staffing — #Glendale, AZ URL #Jobs
5 Soliant Health #IT #Job: Cerner Jobs - Cerner Analyst - San Diego, CA ( #SanDiego , CA) URL #Jobs #TweetMyJobs
6 Tyco #Marketing #Job: Digital Marketing Specialist ( #Monroe , NC) URL #Jobs #TweetMyJobs
7 @USER Timing is everything when announcing a breakup URL
8 Southwest flights briefly diverted to DFW Airport on Friday: A Southwest Airlines plane experiencing mechanical... URL
9 Fort Carson To Welcome Home About 225 Soldiers: FORT CARSON, Colo. (AP) ? Fort Carson will welcome home about 225... URL
10 Joint venture secures $97M in financing for two Boston hotels: Commonwealth Ventures and Ares Management have... URL
TABLE IV: Spammer Sample Tweets
No. Tweet
1 #CallMeCam n#CallMeCam n @USER n nIf Cameron called me it’ll seriously make my day I love you please call me! 100
2 #CallMeCam n#CallMeCam n @USER n nIf Cameron called me it’ll seriously make my day I love you please call me! 321
3 #CallMeCam n#CallMeCam n @USER n nIf Cameron called me it’ll seriously make my day I love you please call me! 167
4 S/o to @USER thanks for the support. Check out my music @USER URL I promise u won’t be disappointed.
5 S/o to @USER destiiny thanks for the support. Check out my music @USER URL I promise u won’t be disappointed.
6 S/o to @USER thanks for the support. Check out my music @USER URL I promise u won’t be disappointed.
7 nAshton Irwin from 5SOS n nMy birthday is in 11 days, nAnd it would be an amazing gift, nIf you could follow me. Ily n @USER n nX3126
8 nAshton Irwin from 5SOS n nMy birthday is today, nAnd it would be an amazing gift, nIf you could follow me. Ily n @USER n nX5408
9 nAshton Irwin from 5SOS n nMy birthday is in 22 days, nAnd it would be an amazing gift, nIf you could follow me. Ily n @USER n nX765
10 nAshton Irwin from 5SOS n nMy birthday is in 8 days, nAnd it would be an amazing gift, nIf you could follow me. Ily n @USER n nX3422
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TABLE V: Human Sample Tweets
No. Tweet
1 I’ll marry whoever comes thru with some food
2 Ewwww them seats #BlackInkCrew
3 @USER if you only knew ???? i like you
4 Really wish he wasn’t so **** busy ??
5 My son’s name is Gabriel.
6 guess I need to get up and get ready then
7 Grandma stayed on me bout not wearing socks in her house aint nobody got time for that
8 Thank you for reading. ??
9 @USER: If only I knew.. ???
10 WHY ARE YOU SO HOT URL
